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Comments
Likelihood of Confusion Under the
Lanham Act: A Question of Fact, a
Question of Law, or Both?*
INTRODUCTION
The Lanham Act' is the basic federal statute governing
trademark2 registration and trademark infringement. 3 In most 4
actions involving trademark infringements or opposition to a
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Kenneth B. Germain
for his guidance in the preparation of this Comment.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982). "'Lanham Act' is the popular name for the
Trademark Act of 1946, as amended." I J. GnsoN, TRADpAm PROTECTION AND
PRACTICE § 1.01 n.20 (1974). "The basic goal of the Act ... [is] 'the protection of
trademarks, securing to the owner the good will of his business and protecting the public
against spurious and falsely marked goods."' In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 1360 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (quoting from S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1274, 1274).
2 "The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. §
1127.
See, e.g., I J. GI.sON, supra note 1, at § 1.0411] n.14.
4 "The exceptions are those cases involving pure dilution, where harm results even
though the public is well aware that the defendant's mark is not the plaintiff's." 3A R.
CALtmANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKs AND MONOPOLIES § 20.01
n.l (4th ed. 1983).
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) provides in part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-
orable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
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mark's registration,6 the crucial issue is whether the use of the
same trademark or two similar marks by different parties is
likely7 to cause confusion. With the decision in Giant Food, Inc.
v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc. ,8 the federal circuits now define
likelihood of confusion in three different ways, 9 and review it
in at least four different ways.10 Not only is likelihood of con-
fusion treated inconsistently among the circuits, but internal
inconsistencies are also apparent." Since trademark law is gov-
erned by federal statute, common sense dictates that a critical
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant....
Id. (emphasis added).
6 Registration of a trademark under the Lanham Act is prima facie evidence of
the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in connection with the goods or services
listed on the registration certificate. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). The grounds for opposing or
refusing a trademark's registration are very limited. Section 1052 provides in part:
No trademark ... shall be refused registration on the principal reg-
ister on account of its nature unless it-
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or a mark or trade name
previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as
to be likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive....
Id. (emphasis added).
" "Likely" means "more probable than not." See, e.g., Javar Coffee Co. v. Jos.
Martinson & Co., 142 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also text accompanying
notes 12-13 infra.
710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See, e.g., id. at 1569 (likelihood of confusion presents a question of law);
Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1982) (likeli-
hood of confusion presents a question of fact); Alpha Indus. v. Alpha Steel, 616 F.2d
440, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1980) (likelihood of confusion presents a mixed question of fact
and law).
10 See, e.g., Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir.
1983) (likelihood of confusion subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard except to the
extent the finding is based on the similarity of the marks themselves); 710 F.2d at 1569
("clearly erroneous" rule is inapplicable); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615
F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (likelihood of confusion
is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard); 616 F.2d at 443-44 (underlying
evidentiary factors are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard, which standard
does not apply to the further determination of likelihood of confusion).
" "Even within some of the circuits, no consistency is observed, with the court
switching from one test to the other, apparently depending upon the court's initial
proclivity to reverse or affirm." 2 T. McCARI, TA aEmAus AND UNtAI Co1mannoN
§ 23.22(B), at 112 (2d ed. 1984).
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issue, such as likelihood of confusion, should receive uniform
treatment throughout the federal judicial system.
Beginning with an examination of the Giant Food decision,
this Comment initially discusses how the circuits have defined
and reviewed likelihood of confusion. The Comment then dis-
cusses some flaws in the various approaches and proposes that
likelihood of confusion is a question of fact and that, therefore,
a lower court's finding of likelihood of confusion should not be
disturbed unless "clearly erroneous."
I. LKEiLHOOD OF CONFUSION: A BRIEF DEFINITION
"Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the
mark would probably assume that the product or service it
represents is associated with the source of a different product
or service identified by a similar mark.' 1 2 Generally, when lower
courts are asked to determine whether consumer confusion is
likely, they initially consider numerous preliminary factors,' 3
such as:14 (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties 5 as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression; (2) the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods or
services on which the marks are used;' 6 (3) the similarity or
dissimilarity of established likely-to-continue trade channels; 17
,2 Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir.
1978). See also I J. GISON, supra note 1, § 5.01 at 5-6. "In assessing the likelihood of
confusion to the public, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer exercising
ordinary caution." AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979).
13 Fletcher, Warning: Changing Standards of Likelihood of Confusion May Be
Hazardous to Your Trademark, 71 TRaDE-MARK REP. 641, 641-42 (1981). See also
Armco, Inc. v. Arnco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1982) (infringement
action); Redken Labs, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 501 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1974) (cancellation
proceeding); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(opposition proceeding).
" These evidentiary factors are not listed in order of importance. See 476 F.2d at
1361-62 ("Each may from case to case play a dominant role.").
is See Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is not proper to dissect a mark.. . ."). However it is proper to give
greater force and effect to the one feature of a mark which may be more significant
than other features. Id.
,6 See 599 F.2d at 350 ("[L]ess similarity between the marks will suffice when...
the goods are similar in use and function.").
,1 See id. at 353 ("Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of
confusion.").
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(4) the conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made;18 (5) the fame of the prior mark as measured by volume
of sales, advertising and length of use;19 (6) the number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods;20 (7) the nature
and extent of any actual confusion;21 and (8) the defendant's
intent in selecting the mark.22
In any given case, the lower court makes findings on each
of the applicable evidentiary factors and, from these findings,
ultimately determines whether likelihood of confusion exists.Y
There is no disagreement in the federal courts on how likelihood
of confusion should be assessed.24 However, when the issue is
raised on appeal the circuits disagree as to whether they are
confronted with a question of fact, a question of law, or both.2
II. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION AS A QUESTION OF LAW
Defining likelihood of confusion as a strictly legal question
is the least followed approach. Currently, only one circuit defines
"1 See id. "When the buyer has expertise in the field, a higher standard is proper
though it will not preclude a finding that confusion is likely.... Similarly, when the
goods are expensive, the buyer can be expected to exercise greater care in his purchases,
again, though confusion may still be likely." Id.
11 See 710 F.2d at 1570 (registrant's mark having acquired considerable fame weighs
in the registrant's favor in determining likelihood of confusion).
21 See 476 F.2d at 1361.
21 See Amp Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1186 (4th Cir. 1976) ("Although actual
confusion is not an essential element in establishing a likelihood to confuse, it is
substantial evidence thereof.").
2 See id. ("[I]ntent to exploit the good will created by an already registered
trademark creates a presumption of a likelihood to confuse.").
2 See Kiki Undies Corp. v. Promenade Hosiery Mills, Inc., 411 F.2d 1097, 1099
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 1054 (1969). In Kiki the court noted:
These factors are variable and relative and no single one, because of its
presence or absence, is, in itself, determinative of a case. Rather, the
method of approach requires the trial court to consider and weigh the
evidence relative to each of these points and such other points as, in the
particular circumstances before it, the court finds applicable; then, from a
balancing of the conclusions reached on all of these factors, the court
decides whether or not the parties are entitled to the relief or protection
sought.
Id. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 642 ("There is no formula, magic or otherwise, for
weighing these factors.").
2A See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 641-42.
2 See note 9 supra.
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and reviews likelihood of confusion in this way.26
A. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.
In Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,27 the
Federal Circuits defines likelihood of confusion as a question
of law. 29 Giant Food involved an opposition to the registration
of a trademark.30 The applicant, Nation's Foodservice, Inc.,
sought to register-for hamburger and hot dog sandwiches, milk
shakes and restaurant services-the mark "Giant Hamburgers"
and a design which prominently displayed the mark.3' The op-
poser, Giant Food, Inc., challenged the registration with a claim
of likelihood of confusion. 32 The opposer based its claim upon
prior use and registration of the marks "Giant Food," "Super
Giant," and designs which displayed the marks "Giant Food"
and "Giant. ' 33 These marks and designs were used for retail
grocery and supermarket services and for private label food
products. 34 Concluding that the applicant's mark was not similar
enough to the marks of the opposer to cause a likelihood of
confusion, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) dis-
missed the opposition. 35 Upon opposer's appeal of the dismissal,
16 The Federal Circuit is the only circuit which currently defines likelihood of
confusion as a question of law. See notes 62 and 92 infra and accompanying text for
the definition of likelihood of confusion in the other circuits. While other circuits
previously defined likelihood of confusion as a purely legal question, they no longer do
so. E.g., compare Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149,
152 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963) (likelihood of confusion is a legal
conclusion) with Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1980)
(likelihood of confusion is a mixed question of fact and law).
710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established
October 1, 1982, by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,
96 Stat. 25. The predecessor courts of the Federal Circuit were the United States Court
of Claims and the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The holdings
of these predecessor courts are binding as precedent in the Federal Circuit. E.g., South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
9 See Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d at 1569.
Id. at 1567.
Id. at 1566.
12 Id. at 1567.
33 Id.
3 Id.
35 Id.
The TTAB concluded on this issue that, in the market in which applicant's
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the applicant argued that likelihood of confusion was a question
of fact and that, therefore, the TTAB's holding could not be
overturned unless "clearly erroneous. ' 3 6 Despite ample case sup-
port for this argument, 37 the Federal Circuit rejected the majority
rule and held instead that "the issue of likelihood of confusion
is the ultimate conclusion of law to be decided by the court,
and ... the clearly erroneous rule is not applicable. '3
In reversing the TTAB's decision, the court found that con-
products are sold, purchasers would construe the term GIANT HAM-
BURGERS as a size indicator, and thus would not confuse applicant's
mark with opposer's mark. The TTAB also concluded that the overall
differences in the presentation of the marks would prevent any likelihood
of confusion.
Id.
See id. at 1569.
37 See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
31 710 F.2d at 1569. The Giant Food court did not analyze likelihood of confusion
to determine whether the issue more closely resembled a question of law or a question
of fact. (For a discussion of whether likelihood of confusion more closely resembles a
question of fact or a question of law, see notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text).
Instead, noting that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) had not felt
constrained to review likelihood of confusion under a narrow standard of review, the
court apparently decided to legitimate what it perceived as an intentional disregard of
the "clearly erroneous" doctrine and defined likelihood of confusion as a question of
law. See 710 F.2d at 1569.
The Giant Food court cited three cases-In re Superior Outdoor Display, Inc., 478
F.2d 1388 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357
(C.C.P.A. 1973); and Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728 (C.C.P.A.
1968)-as authority for stating that the CCPA "did not consider itself bound by a
narrow standard of review." See 710 F.2d at 1569.
In In re Superior Outdoor Display, Inc., the TTAB refused to register Superior's
trademark "Superior" for electrically illuminated outdoor displays. The refusal was
based on a prior registration, by another, of the same mark for electrical products. See
478 F.2d at 1388. Even though the prior registrant had agreed to Superior's registration
and use of the same mark, the TTAB still found that a likelihood of confusion would
emanate from the concurrent use of the same mark on Superior's replacement parts and
on several of the prior registrant's products. Id. at 1390. Therefore, Superior's appli-
cation for registration was dismissed. See id. at 1388.
On appeal the CCPA reversed the TTAB, stating that likelihood of confusion
"must be decided in relation to the goods for which registration is sought." Id. at 1391.
Since Superior only sought registration for the use of the mark on its outdoor displays,
the court found that Superior's possible use of the mark on its replacement parts was
irrelevant to the registration sought. See id. Thus, due to the TTAB's improper consid-
eration of "a use which might occur on goods not described or not included within the
description of goods in the application," the CCPA reversed. Id. (emphasis in original).
The Giant Food court interpreted Superior as an example of broad appellate review.
710 F.2d at 1569. However, with the CCPA's reversal being predicated on the TTAB's
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irrelevant consideration of uses which might occur, Superior appears to have said that
the TTAB's decision was "clearly erroneous". Therefore, it is this author's opinion that
Superior can just as easily be interpreted as an example of narrow appellate review.
The second case cited in Giant Food as an example of broad appellate review
closely resembles Superior. In In re E.L DuPont DeNemours & Co., the TTAB refused
to register DuPont's mark due to another party's prior registration of the same mark.
See 476 F.2d at 1359. As in Superior, registration was refused even though the prior
registrant consented to DuPont's use of the mark. This consent was evidenced in an
agreement whereby the parties sought to avoid any likelihood of consumer confusion by
setting boundaries for the concurrent use of the same mark. See id. The TTAB gave
very little weight to this detailed agreement and based its refusal to register DuPont's
mark on its desire to protect the "public interest" from the likelihood of confusion
which would result from the concurrent use of the same mark by different parties on
closely related goods. See id. at 1359-60.
On appeal, the CCPA stated that "[t]he weight to be given more detailed agreements
of the type presented here should be substantial." See id. at 1362. In addition the CCPA
stated that the "citation of 'the public interest' as a basis for refusal of registration is
a bootless cry." See id. at 1364. Therefore, the TTAB's decision was reversed. See id.
at 1363.
Quoting language from DuPont, the Giant Food court noted that " '[i]t is the duty
of the examiner, the board and this court . . .' to determine the ultimate issue of
likelihood of confusion," and interpreted this language as a clear indication that the
CCPA "did not apply the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review to the [likelihood of
confusion] issue." 710 F.2d at 1569 (emphasis added by the Giant Food court) (quoting
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1362). Unfortunately, this passage
was taken out of context. The DuPont court had actually said that "[it is the duty of
the examiner, the board and this court to find, upon consideration of all the evidence,
whether or not confusion appears likely." 476 F.2d at 1362 (emphasis in original). The
court had also held that the TTAB had improperly failed to consider all the evidence
when it disregarded the detailed agreement between DuPont and the prior registrant.
See id. Read in light of the entire opinion, the above quoted language was not likely
meant as a clear indication of broad appellate review. Instead, like Superior, DuPont
appears to be another instance in which the TTAB's decision was "clearly erroneous."
The last case cited in Giant Food as direct support for a broad standard of review
was Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728. See 710 F.2d at 1569.
Krim-Ko involved a cancellation proceeding in which Coca-Cola sought to cancel Krim-
Ko's registered composite mark "Beep For Breakfast." See 390 F.2d at 729. The TTAB
segregated the word "Beep" from Krim-Ko's composite mark and compared it with
Coca-Cola's mark, "Veep." Based upon this side-by-side comparison, the TTAB con-
cluded that confusion would be likely. See id. at 733.
On appeal the CCPA acknowledged that a comparison of the marks was relevant
in determining likelihood of confusion, stressing, however, that the marks should be
compared in their entireties. See id. Cf. note 15 supra. Therefore, the court held that
the TTAB had erred in dissecting Krim-Ko's composite mark and comparing only the
dissected portion with Coca-Cola's mark. See 390 F.2d at 733.
One feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant than the other
features and, consequently, given greater force and effect in a likelihood of confusion
analysis. See, e.g., note 15 supra. Nevertheless, the analysis must yet consider each of
the involved marks in its entirety. E.g., Burger Chef Sys., Inc. v. Sandwich Chef, Inc.,
608 F.2d 875, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See also 710 F.2d at 1570 (not proper to dissect a
mark); note 15 supra and accompanying text. The TTAB clearly erred when it dissected
1984-85]
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sumers in opposer's area39 "would likely conclude that the word
'Giant' in applicant's mark refers to opposer as the sponsor,
source and origin of applicant's products." 4 For the purpose of
this Comment, the most significant aspect of Giant Food is not
the court's reversal, but rather its decision that likelihood of
confusion is a question of law.
A close reading of Giant Food reveals that the court also
defines the underlying evidentiary factors4' as questions of law. 42
Krim-Ko's mark and used this dissection as its basis for determining the likelihood of
confusion.
The Giant Food court interpreted Superior, DuPont and Krim-Ko as clearly indi-
cating that the CCPA does not apply the "clearly erroneous" doctrine to likelihood of
confusion. In this author's opinion, these cases actually represent instances in which the
"clearly erroneous" doctrine was applied.
11 The court noted:
Applicant seeks a geographically unrestricted registration under which it
might expand throughout the United States. Under these facts, it is not
proper ... to limit our consideration to the likelihood of confusion in the
areas presently occupied by the parties.... [T]he geographical distance
between the present locations of the respective businesses of the two parties
has little relevance in this case.
710 F.2d at 1568-69.
,0 Id. at 1571. The court's determination that a likelihood of confusion did exist
was based on several preliminary evidentiary factors. First, the court held that opposer's
marks had acquired considerable fame. This conclusion was based on finding that
opposer had used its mark continuously for over 45 years, that opposer had a high sales
volume, and that opposer's mark had been promoted on both national and local
television. See id. at 1569-70.
The second factor considered by the court was the "similarity or dissimilarity and
nature of the goods and services on which the marks [were] used." Id. at 1570. The
court found a similarity in the items sold by the two parties and held that even though
"the average consumer makes a distinction between fast-food restaurants and super-
markets ... if the marks themselves are confusingly similar, customers of the fast-food
restaurant would be likely to believe that opposer owned, sponsored, or supplied that
business." Id.
Next, the court focused on the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks themselves.
The court noted that the dominant portion of each mark was the word "Giant." See
id. In addition, the court found that the dominant portion of both parties' marks
sounded the same when spoken. See id. at 1571. The court concluded "that the similar-
ities in appearance, sound and overall commercial impression outweigh[ed] dissimilari-
ties." Id.
The only factor in applicant's favor was the lack, despite concurrent use over
several years, of evidence of actual confusion. Id. at 1571.
41 See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the preliminary
evidentiary factors.
42 See 710 F.2d at 1569. The court did not examine the TTAB's findings on the
preliminary evidentiary factors, but rather considered the applicable evidentiary factors
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Therefore the Federal Circuit decides de novo both the under-
lying evidentiary factors and the ultimate conclusion drawn from
these factors. This decision gives the Federal Circuit a virtually
unrestricted review of the likelihood of confusion issue.
43
B. Some Problems With the Decision
There are two obvious problems with the Giant Food deci-
sion. First, likelihood of confusion does not actually resemble a
legal question." The relevant standard-likelihood of confusion
of the ordinary purchaser-is analogous to the negligence stand-
ard. 45 A question of law "involves the formulation in general
terms of principles potentially applicable to many civil
cases .... "46 On the other hand, "[1]ikelihood of confusion is
not determinable by any precise formula. It is a relative concept,
to be determined according to the particular circumstances of
de novo: "W~e now turn to a consideration of the evidentiary factors .. " Id. (emphasis
added).
' The "clearly erroneous" doctrine does not apply to questions of law. E.g., 5A
J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcncE § 52.03[2] (2d ed. 1982). An appellate court is
entirely free to reverse a pure question of law. See, e.g., Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T.
Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 20, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 920
(1976).
" Concededly, the court did not define likelihood of confusion as a question of
law because of its similarity to a legal question. See note 38 supra for a discussion of
the reasoning behind the court's definition.
11 See Ropski, The Federal Trademark Jury Trial-Awakening of a Dormant
Constitutional Right, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 177, 201 (1980). As stated by Ropski:
Like negligence, the likelihood of confusion standard embodies a
judgment based upon the facts and the protection of the public. Asking
the jury to decide likelihood of confusion forces each juror to view the
facts as an ordinary purchaser, and to decide whether such a hypothetical
purchaser is likely to be confused by the use of plaintiff's and defendant's
marks on their respective goods. The juror is asked to draw upon his or
her experience to decide whether the similarity between the marks as used
on the goods is enough to engender confusion and warrant protection of
the public, in a manner analogous to determining negligence under the
reasonable person standard.
Id.
" Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAnt. L. REv.
1867, 1869 (1966). Weiner explains:
To take a simple example, assume that defendant has engaged in a course
of conduct which has caused injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that
defendant is absolutely liable, whereas defendant contends that he is not
liable unless he was at fault. It is safe to say that all our courts would
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each case." 47 Although appellate courts have wide discretion in
deciding whether a particular issue presents a legal or factual
question,4s the Federal Circuit appears to have abused this dis-
cretion in defining likelihood of confusion as a question of law.
The second problem is that Giant Food encourages forum
shopping.49 In opposition proceedings, section 1071 of the Lan-
ham Act provides that a party who is dissatisfied with the
TTAB's decision may either appeal to the Federal Circuit or
,commence a civil action in the district courts. 0 In addition, an
appeal to the Federal Circuit must be dismissed if any adverse
party to the proceeding, other than the Commissioner, files a
civil action within twenty days after the appellant has filed notice
of appeal.
5 1
If the appeal remains in the Federal Circuit, the appellate
decision must be based solely on the evidence produced before
the TTAB.5 2 However, as a result of Giant Food, if the issue
upon appeal is whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the
litigants start afresh in the sense of being permitted to reargue
that evidence.-3
classify this dispute as presenting a question of law to be resolved by the
trial judge. The determination that the defendant is or is not absolutely
liable will establish a principle which will have broad application to similar
disputes.
Id.
47 3A R. CAuMAmN, supra note 4, at § 20.07. See also In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours
& Co., 476 F.2d at 1361 (each case must be decided on its own facts); Hills Bros. Coffee,
Inc. v. Hills Supermarket, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1046, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 428 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1970); Javar Coffee Co. v. Jos. Martinson & Co., 142 F.
Supp. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The DuPont court specifically stated: "There is no litmus rule which can provide
a ready guide to all cases." 476 F.2d at 1361. Ironically, this very case is relied upon in
Giant Food as authority for defining likelihood of confusion as a question of law. For
a discussion of the DuPont case see note 38 supra.
48 5 Am. JuR. 2D Appeal and Error § 829 (1964).
41 Forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a
particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment
or verdict." BLACK's LAW DIcnoNARY 590 (5th ed. 1979).
- See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (1982). This section actually authorizes an appeal to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; however, in 1982, the CCPA was replaced
by the Federal Circuit. See note 28 supra.
5 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4).
11 For a discussion of how the Federal Circuit reviews the issue of likelihood of
confusion, see note 43 supra and accompanying text.
CONFUSION UNDER THE LN ACT
Conversely, if either party commences a civil action pursuant
to section 1071 ,54 the parties may admit the TTAB's record and
also produce further evidence relevant to the issues raised before
the TTAB .5  Even though this civil action is sometimes labeled
a trial de novo, 56 "[tihe statute provides that evidence may be
taken de novo, not that the district court is to ignore the decision
of the board. ' 57 "[T]he decision of the [TTAB] must be accepted
as controlling on issues of fact unless the contrary is established
by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough
conviction. ' 5 8 Thus, in a civil action, within those circuits which
define likelihood of confusion as a question of fact,59 the party
seeking reversal must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the TTAB's decision on likelihood of confusion is erroneous. 60
Clearly, when the issue is whether confusion is likely, the
party seeking reversal carries a much heavier burden of persua-
sion in those circuits defining the issue as a question of fact
than in the Federal Circuit. 61 As a result of Giant Food, the
party who is disappointed with the TTAB's decision will un-
doubtedly appeal to the Federal Circuit for a de novo determi-
nation of whether confusion is likely. On the other hand, adverse
parties now have every incentive to force dismissal of that appeal
by commencing a civil action within a circuit which defines the
issue as a question of fact. Undeniably, defining likelihood of
confusion as a question of law creates serious problems.
'4 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(3).
,6 See, e.g., Wilson Jones Co. v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 216, 218
(2d Cir. 1964) (civil action is intended to be a trial de novo).
' Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d at 21. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1071(b)(3).
11 332 F.2d at 218. See also 526 F.2d at 21 (Board's findings as to likelihood of
confusion "must be accepted unless the contrary is established by evidence carrying
'thorough conviction'); Fleetwood Co. v. Hazel Bishop, Inc., 352 F.2d 841 (7th Cir.
1965) (TTAB's decision is controlling unless the contrary is established by clear and
convincing testimony).
" For a list of the circuits which define likelihood of confusion as a question of
fact see note 62 infra.
60 See Radiator Specialty Co. v. Ladd, 218 F. Supp. 827, 829 (D.D.C. 1963).
1, "In the district court there [is] substantial burden on opposer, whether or not
expressed in terms of clear error, to overcome the Board's purely evidentiary findings."
526 F.2d at 21. For a discussion of the appellant's burden of persuasion in the Federal
Circuit, see text accompanying note 52-53 supra.
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III. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION AS A QUESTION OF FACT
The majority of the federal circuits define likelihood of
confusion as a question of fact.62 However, there is disagreement
among these circuits as to the permissible scope of appellate
review.
63
A. Strict Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule
Seven of the nine circuits which define likelihood of confu-
sion as a question of fact, review all aspects of the issue-both
the preliminary factors and the ultimate determination-under
the narrow confines of the "clearly erroneous" doctrine.64 The
"clearly erroneous" doctrine is based upon Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is applicable "[iun all
actions tried upon the facts without a jury.... 65
Under the "clearly erroneous" doctrine "[an appellate court
cannot substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of
the trial court simply because the reviewing court 'might give
the facts another construction, resolve the ambiguities differ-
ently, and find a more sinister cast to actions which the District
Court apparently deemed innocent." ' 66 In order to reverse the
62 See, e.g., Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 20 (1st
Cir. 1975); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1969); Amp Inc. v.
Foy, 540 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1976); Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693
F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1982); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.
1959), cert.-denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959); Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1983); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); Hot
Shot Quality Prods. v. Sifers Chems., 452 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1971); Safeway Stores
v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160 (11th Cir. 1982).
63 Compare Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d at 22
("clearly erroneous" rule applies regardless of the form of the record) with Miss
Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d at 509 (trial court's determination of likelihood of
confusion based upon a comparison of the marks themselves is not subject to the
"clearly erroneous" standard).
61 See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d at 1159; Sarah
Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d at 22; Communications Satellite
Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1250 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 266 F.2d at 138.
61 FRCP 52(a). Rule 52(a) provides in part: "Findings of fact should not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." (emphasis added). Cf. U.S.
CoNsr. amend. VII (a jury's finding of fact shall not be reexamined in any court unless
according to the rules of the common law).
Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 495 (1950)).
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lower court's finding, the "clearly erroneous" doctrine requires
that, after reviewing all the evidence, an appellate court must be
"left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed." 67 In addition, the burden of persuasion rests
with the appellant. 68 Therefore, as opposed to the broad de novo
review permitted when likelihood of confusion is defined as a
purely legal question,69 defining the entire issue as a question of
fact results in a very narrow review under which the appellant
must show not only that the lower court erred, but also that it
clearly erred.
B. A Different Interpretation of the "Clearly Erroneous"
Doctrine
The Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit also define li-
kelihood of confusion as a question of fact.70 However, unlike
the circuits previously discussed, these circuits do not apply the
"clearly erroneous" doctrine to every phase of their review.7 '
When reviewing the district court's finding as to the similarity
of the marks themselves,7 2 these circuits disregard the "clearly
erroneous" doctrine. 73 "On the other hand, the district court's
findings with respect to the other relevant factors74 ... are
subject to the 'clearly erroneous' standard normally applicable
to findings of fact." '
75
These circuits seem to interpret FRCP 52(a) as requiring
deference to the trial judge's decision only in those instances
where the trial judge is in a better position to evaluate the
evidence, for example, where the credibility of witnesses is in-
61 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
" See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 266 F.2d at 143.
For a discussion of the standard of review for a legal question see note 43 supra.
70 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
7, Cf. note 63 supra and accompanying text.
72 For a brief discussion of the preliminary factor dealing with the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks, see note 15 supra and accompanying text.
71 See Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d at 354 (to the extent that
likelihood of confusion is based upon the similarity of the marks themselves the "clearly
erroneous" rule is inapplicable); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d at 509 (to
the degree that "likelihood of confusion" rests upon a comparison of the marks
themselves, the "clearly erroneous" rule is inapplicable).
11 For a brief discussion of the other preliminary factors see notes 16-22 supra and
accompanying text.
7, 717 F.2d at 354; 408 F.2d at 509.
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volved.7 6 Since the trial judge enjoys no advantage over the
appellate court when likelihood of confusion is determined by a
comparison of the marks, this particular evidentiary factor is
not reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" doctrine. 77 This
interpretation of FRCP 52 has generated much discussion 78 and
has been criticized as being "inconsistent with our basic judicial
structure ... at best [encouraging] appeals at the expense of
another important principle, the need for finality."
79
C. The Proper Interpretation of FRCP 52(a)
1. The Intended Scope of the Rule
Excluding nondemeanor evidence 0 from the constraints of
the "clearly erroneous" doctrine conflicts directly with the in-
tended scope of FRCP 52(a). "[Ihe intent of... the draftsman
of Rule 52, was to have the 'clearly erroneous' test apply re-
gardless of the nature of the evidence ... ."81 In addition, the
form of the rule itself seems to prohibit any distinction between
findings based on demeanor evidence and findings based on
nondemeanor evidence. As stated by Professor Wright:
Rule 52 says that findings shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
76 See, e.g., Benrose Fabrics Corp. v. Rosenstein, 183 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir.
1950) (appellate court is in as good a position as trial court to pass upon weight of the
evidence if credibility of witnesses is not involved).
17 Id. See also 717 F.2d at 354 ("[To the extent the determination is predicated
on the similarity of the marks themselves, this Court is in as good a position as the trial
judge to determine likelihood of confusion.").
78 See, e.g., Annot., 11 A.L.R. FED. 212 (1972); 5 Am. JuR. 2D Appeal and Error
§ 845 (1964).
79 Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, 526 F.2d at 22.
91 Nondemeanor evidence does not require the court to judge the credibility of
witnesses, e.g., where the case is based on documentary evidence or undisputed basic
facts. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. FED. 212, § 3(a) (1972).
SI Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MIN. L. Rv. 751,
768 (1956-57). "[The 'clearly erroneous' test] is applicable to all cases tried without a
jury whether the finding is of fact concerning which there was conflict of testimony, or
of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testimony." FRCP 52 Advisory
Committee Note of 1937 (emphasis added).
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witnesses. If the word "and" means anything, it must mean
that these are two separate restrictions being placed on appel-
late review of findings.
8 2
Clearly, the Second and Seventh Circuits' interpretation of FRCP
52(a) is inconsistent with both the intended scope and the form
of the rule.
2. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Inwood
Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories"3 also seems to forbid any
distinction between demeanor and nondemeanor findings of fact.
Ives, the owner of a registered mark attempted to hold Inwood
vicariously liable84 for trademark infringement . 5 The district
court found that Ives had failed to make the factual showing
necessary to establish vicarious liability and, therefore, entered
judgment for Inwood. 6 The court of appeals reversed, since, in
its estimation, the district court had failed to give sufficient
weight to Ives' evidence of infringement.8 7 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the
court of appeals.8 8 The Court stated that in reviewing findings
of fact the court of appeals is bound by the "clearly erroneous"
standard of FRCP 52(a) and that, therefore, the court of appeals
erred in setting aside findings of fact that were not clearly
erroneous 9
Even though Inwood included findings based on both de-
Wright, supra note 81, at 769 (emphasis in original).
.3 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
14 "[L]iability for trademark infringement can extend beyond those who actually
mislabel goods with the mark of another." Id. at 853.
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe
a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows
or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manu-
facturer or distributor is contributorialIy responsible for any harm done as
a result of the deceit.
Id.
s Id. at 854.
See id. at 855.
87 Id.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 855.
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meanor and nondemeanor evidence, 90 the Court did not distin-
guish between the two types of findings. The Court's criticism
of the court of appeals, for substituting its interpretation of the
evidence for that of the trial judge, clearly extended to instances
where the findings were based on nondemeanor evidence. 9'
Excluding nondemeanor evidence from the constraints of
FRCP 52(a) conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding in In-
wood and with the intended scope of the Rule. FRCP 52(a) was
intended to apply to all findings of fact regardless of whether
the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to
decide the issue. If likelihood of confusion is defined as a
question of fact, the entire issue should be reviewed under the
"clearly erroneous" doctrine. Any other standard of review
results in a misapplication of FRCP 52(a).
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION AS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT
AND LAW
The third definition for likelihood of confusion is found in
the Third and Ninth Circuits. These circuits define likelihood of
confusion as a mixed question of fact and lawY Under this
definition, underlying evidentiary factors93 are defined as ques-
tions of fact 94 and the final determination drawn by the trial
court from these evidentiary factors-whether a likelihood of
confusion exists-is defined as either an ultimate fact or a legal
conclusion. 95 As a result of this mixed definition, the Third and
Ninth Circuits review likelihood of confusion under a two-step
analysis.
96
See id. at 855-59.
, See id. at 856. The Court criticized the court of appeals for weighting a survey
based on test shoppers more heavily than the trial court did. See id. at 856 n.16. Clearly
a survey would be nondemeanor evidence.
92 See, e.g., Alpha Indus. v. Alpha Steel, 616 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1980); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1955).
91 For a brief discussion of the preliminary factors see notes 15-22 supra and
accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., 616 F.2d at 443-44; 219 F.2d at 591 n.2.
91 See, e.g., 616 F.2d at 443-44 (legal conclusion); 219 F.2d at 591 (ultimate fact).
96 See, e.g., 616 F.2d 440; 219 F.2d 590.
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A. Review Under the Two-Step Analysis
The two-step review, which occurs when likelihood of con-
fusion is both a legal and factual determination, seems to strike
a balance between a legal question's virtually unrestricted ap-
pellate review97 and a factual question's narrow "clearly erro-
neous" review.98 Initially, the appellate court reviews the trial
court's findings on each of the applicable evidentiary factors. 99
Since these findings are factual determinations,00 they must not
be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 01 Then, the appellate court
reviews de novo the final determination drawn by the trial court
from the evidentiary factors.' 2 Since this determination is an
ultimate or legal conclusion, 03 it is not protected by the "clearly
erroneous" doctrine.' 4 This mixed definition and review of li-
kelihood of confusion seems to allow the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits a fairly broad standard of review 05 aimed at ensuring, in
any given case, that justice is done.106
B. Allowing Appellate Courts to "Do Justice"
As Professor Wright states: "[The notion that appellate
" For a brief discussion of the standard for reviewing a trial court's finding of
law see note 43 supra.
9s For a brief discussion of the standard for reviewing a trial court's finding of
fact see text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
" See Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1980); 219 F.2d
at 591-93.
'90 See text accompanying notes 93-94 supra.
,0, 646 F.2d at 350; 219 F.2d at 591.
102 646 F.2d at 350; 219 F.2d at 591.
101 See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
'04 646 F.2d at 350; 219 F.2d at 591. The "clearly erroneous" doctrine does not
apply to questions of law. See 5A J. Mooma, supra note 43, at 52.03[2]. See also
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (findings of "ultimate facts"
are independently reviewable). But cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286
n.16 (1982) (Baumgartner does "not mean that whenever the result in a case turns on a
factual finding, an appellate court need not remain within the constraints of Rule 52.").
101 Under the two-step review, the Third and Ninth Circuits are permitted to reverse
a lower court's ultimate conclusion even though its findings on the underlying preliminary
factors are not clearly erroneous. See text accompanying notes 96-104 supra.
'06 See generally Wright, supra note 81, at 779. Wright discusses several examples
of broadened appellate review and states that the motivating force behind the broadening
of appellate review is the court's desire to "do justice." Id.
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courts should undertake to 'do justice' is so attractive on its
face that it is difficult to disagree with it. . . .Nevertheless...
we should refrain from agreeing that appellate courts are to do
justice until we have seen the price we must pay for this con-
cept."1 07
The price for a broad standard of review is an increase in
the number of appeals, resulting in an increase in the cost of
litigation and a reduction in the confidence of litigants and the
public in the decisions of trial courts. 08 Even though a mixed
definition for likelihood of confusion appears to allow courts to
do immediate justice, perhaps, as Professor Wright suggests,
"the best way to do justice in the long run is to confine to a
minimum appellate tampering with the work of the trial
courts. "19
CONCLUSION
Likelihood of confusion is the crucial issue surrounding fed-
eral trademark protection. Under the Lanham Act, the owner
of a registered mark will be protected from another's use of a
similar mark if the other party's mark is likely to confuse
consumers as to the source of the goods and services. Whether
the trial court decides that confusion is likely depends upon its
findings on numerous evidentiary factors. However, whether the
appellate court is bound by the trial court's findings depends,
in large part, upon the circuit hearing the appeal.
Currently, at the federal appellate level, there are three dif-
ferent definitions for likelihood of confusion. As a result, the
appellate court's review of the issue, as well as the appellant's
burden of persuasion, varies. This inconsistent treatment of a
crucial issue, and of litigants, should be eliminated by a uniform
appellate definition and review of likelihood of confusion.
Likelihood of confusion more closely resembles a question
107 Id.
,03 Id. Professor Wright notes, "Appeals are always expensive and time-consum-
ing .... [Elvery time a trial judge is reversed, every time the belief is reiterated that
appellate courts are better qualified than trial judges to decide what justice requires, the
confidence of litigants and the public in the trial courts will be further impaired." Id.
at 780.
109 Id. at 782.
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of fact than a question of law. Unlike a legal question, likelihood
of confusion resists assessment "by precise formulae under in-
flexible rules.""10 Each case must be decided on its own peculiar
set of facts and circumstances. Thus, the entire issue is well-
suited for the finder of fact.
As a factual determination, likelihood of confusion must be
reviewed narrowly. Even though the appellate court may be in
as good a position as the trial court to decide the issue, the trial
court's findings must stand unless clearly erroneous. A broader
appellate review of the trial court's decision invades the province
of the finder of fact, conflicts with the intended scope of FRCP
52(a), and impairs the confidence of litigants in trial courts.
If all owners of registered trademarks are to be accorded
equal protection from the use of confusingly similar marks and
if appellate review is to give due respect to trial court findings,
likelihood of confusion must be defined and reviewed uniformly
as a question of fact.
Janet Shiffler Thomas
110 Hills Bros. Coffee, Inc. v. Hills Supermarket, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1046, 1050
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 428 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1970).
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